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The topic of MNC international entry choice is relatively developed and has been growing for 
more than two decades in IB (international business) area.  Since one of the basic questions of IB 
research is why and how firms go aboard, the topic of how and why firms choose certain entry 
strategies into host countries has been brought to the table and gained much attention by the 
scholars. Despite of the development in IB field, this research on entry choice in the area of 
hospitality hasn’t progressed much. This gap could be shown by comparing the theories that are 
used or established for explaining international expansion in IB area with those applied in 
hospitality field. This paper aims to summarize and compare the researches on this topic in both 
fields, shedding light on the future research on international expansion in the area of hospitality 
management. Several worth-noting theories and research agenda in management and IB field   
are suggested by the authors.  The paper is structured into three sections. First, it reviews the 
different categories of entry choices from different perspectives. Then it elaborates the six most 
commonly applied theoretical perspectives on international entry choice: transaction cost 
economies, resource based view, perspective of knowledge flows, agency theory, institutional 
theory, and Dunning’s eclectic framework. Finally, a brief review on entry choice in hospitality 
field and suggestions on the future research in hospitality industry are illustrated in the paper.  
 
Entry choice categories 
 
Although there is not complete listing of mode structures exists, the mostly investigated choice is 
between wholly owned subsidiaries (WOS) and joint ventures (JV). Some studies have also 
explored the choice between contracts and equity (franchising contracts vs. company-owned 
outlet, management contracts vs. production subsidiaries). Brouthers and Hennart (2007) have 
identified 16 different entry modes based on the previous studies. According to their argument, 
there are two main views on the meaning and the categories of entry modes. The first perspective 
considers contracts, JVs and WOSs as a continuum of increasing control, commitment and risk. 
WOS would be chosen if MNCs exert maximum control, make maximum commitment and take 
on maximum risks. Contracts would be selected when MNCs want minimum control, make 
relatively less commitment and take on minimum risks. Based on this view, scholars identified 
several mode structures. For instance, Erramilli and Rao (1990) identified 11 types of entry mode 
namely ranging from Greenfield WOS venture to licensing and franchising; Anderson and 
Gatignon (1986) listed 17 mode structures ranging from WOSs to small shareholder 
organizations. From this point of view, certain variables determine the choices. For example, low 
asset specificity determines licensing and intermediate asset specificity predicts JVs, and high 
asset specificity determines WOSs.   
The second perspective is represented by Hennart (1988, 2000), who doesn’t agree that JV is a 
step in the continuum between contracts and WOS but categorized entry modes into two types, 
contracts and equity (JVs and WOSs). The main difference between the  contract and equity is, 
in Hennart’s opinion, is the fact that input suppliers are paid ex post from the profits of the 
venture in equity, while in contracts the payments are specified ex ante. Hennart further argued 
that the former is efficient when defining what they must contribute is difficult ahead of time and 
measuring contribution is costly after the cooperation.  Hennart (2000) also mentioned buying 
local factors of production is sometimes difficult. The firms with the hard-to-transact assets will 
integrate into WOS if the assets can be bought on the market; in contrast, if the assets held by the 
MNE can be easily purchased on the market, a local firm with hard-to-transact assets will 
contract the technology and establish a domestic WOS. When both the MNC’s and local firm’s 
assets are hard to transact, JV would occur. Thus Hennart (1988) argued that JVs are not an 
intermediate entry mode between market and hierarchy but rather a solution of the double market 
failure. He also mentioned that JVs are categorized in the hierarchy/equity category, and “JVs 
are the any type of setup where input providers are paid for their inputs through a share of the 
profits of the venture.” Meanwhile, the partial acquisitions and JV Greenfields should be 
categorized as JVs. This is not in line with the literature such as Kogut & Singh (1988) who 
argued that the term JV refers to the shared new ventures with separate legal personalities. 
Brouthers and Hennart (2007) adapted and adopted Hennart (2000)’s definition of the JVs and 
differentiate contracts, WOSs and JVs as shown by Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1.  Contracts, Wholly owned subsidiaries (WOS), and Equity Joint Ventures(JVs) 
 Input contributed by MNEs 
Hard to sell Easy to sell 
Inputs 
contributed 
by local 
firms 
Hard to sell JVs between MNE and local 
firm 
WOS by local firm (takes 
licenses/ franchise form MNE) 
Easy to sell Wholly owned by MNE  
Source: Brouthers and Hennart (2007)  
 
In sum, Brouthers and Hennart (2007) adapted Hennart (2000)’s model of entry modes , 
classified the modes of entry into three cells (JV, WOS by local firm and WOS by MNE), and 
shows JV is not some intermediate form between market and hierarchy but results from joint 
internalization because of double market failure (Hennart, 1998). Moreover, the authors also 
distinguishes the level of ownership (contracts, JV, WOS) and the establishment mode 
(Greenfield vs. acquisitions), both of which are mixed used by scholars.   
Meyer et al. (2009a) classified modes of FDI into three types: Greenfield, acquisition, and Joint 
Venture (JV). JVs partially integrate local resources from a local partner and acquisitions 
integrate the local firm in toto. Both of JV and acquisition offer access to resources that are held 
by local firms. Greenfield doesn’t directly approach local firm as organizational resources but 
allow the MNC to purchase or contract for local resources. The authors stated that there are two 
sequential stages in the entry decisions; firstly deciding partial ownership (JV) vs. full ownership 
(acquisition/Greenfield), and then choosing between acquisition and Greenfield if full ownership 
is preferred. But in practice, they argue, the two stages are often blurred, such that studies 
examine the three entry choices simultaneously (Kogut and Singh, 1988; Chang and 
Rosenzweig, 2001; Elango and Sambharya, 2004).       
From the perspective of  ways of obtaining resources and capabilities, Andreu, Claver and Quer 
(2010) stated that there are three entry strategies, namely internal growth (developing resources 
on its own), external growth (acquiring firms which possess the needed resources and 
capabilities), and intermediate or cooperative growth (cooperating with other companies that 
own the needed resources and capabilities).  
Scholars have kept on looking at and defining entry modes from different levels and 
perspectives. Besides these various definitions of entry choice per se, scholars have tried to 
explain the phenomena of international expansion through using different theories, such as 
transaction cost economies, resource based view, knowledge flow perspective, agency theory, 
institutional theory, and eclectic paradigm. 
 
Transaction cost economies  
 
From the transaction cost economics (TCE) perspective, the choice of entry mode is the one that 
minimizes the transaction costs due to the asset specificity, high frequency, uncertainty, and 
opportunism (Williamson, 1981, 1985). TCE suggests that firms try to evaluate the cost and 
benefit of operating and transacting related to the different entry modes in the local markets. 
Since the market imperfection exists and causes the misunderstanding, conflict that leads to 
delay, breakdown, or malfunction, the choice of entry strategy depends on a comparison of 
coordination costs incurred from internalization and the transaction costs arising from interaction 
with potential partners in local markets (Brouthers, 2002). The international joint venture lies 
between the pure market mode (ex. contract) and wholly owned strategy and it is preferred over 
the market mode when market imperfection is significant for intermediate product, especially the 
industry or country specific knowledge and key access to distribution channels are required. It is 
more difficult or expensive to acquire or replicate the assets that are necessary to produce the 
intermediary goods (Hennart, 1998).  
Asset specificity is a central variable in the majority of these studies. But the related researches 
found mixed results about this explanatory variable. Some studies’ results support for TCE’s 
prediction that high asset specificity is related to the use of high control modes (whole owned 
subsidiary) (Brouthers & Brouthers, 2003; Brouthers et al. 2003; Makino & Neupert, 2000); but 
other studies found the opposite effect (Delios & Beamish, 1999; Palenzuela & Bolillo, 1999).  
Brouthers and Hennart (2007) ‘s review indicates that the majority of transaction cost-based 
entry mode studies tends to find no significant relationship between asset specificity and entry 
mode choice (e.g., K. D. Brouthers & Brouthers, 2003; Delios & Beamish, 1999; Gatignon & 
Anderson, 1988; Hennart, 1991; Hennart & Larimo, 1998; Kim & Hwang, 1992; Taylor, Zou, & 
Osland, 1998).  
Frequency is another dimension that affects firm entry mode choices (or boundary decisions), 
according to Williamson (1985), the choice between market contracting and integrating 
transactions within the firm. The fixed costs involved in integrating transactions in the firm can 
only be justified when the volume of transactions is large enough. Thus frequency is an 
important determinant of the choice between contracts and equity.  
 
Resource based view 
 
From the resource based view (RBV), the choice of international expansion hinges on whether 
and to what extent the expanding investing firms require context-specific (location-bounded) 
resources to achieve the competitive advantages (Meyer & Peng, 2005). The main analysis 
centers on the extant assets exploitation or resources augmentation for the purpose of creating 
new resources, both of which contribute to the link between MNCs’ resource endowments and 
their growth path in international expansion (Meyer, et al. 2009b). Context-specific resources 
could be obtained from network, relationships with related firms, distribution channels and even 
government authorities, especially in the emerging economies where formal institutions are weak 
(Peng & Heath, 1996). Context-specific capabilities such as organizational flexibility, ability to 
managing local labor forces and capability of managing interfaces with local government are all 
considered to be critical factors to achieve competitiveness. MNCs in this case may prefer to 
establish their foreign operations with a local partner as a joint venture or through acquisition, 
especially when MNCs purse in intangible rather than tangible assets since the former is likely to 
involve higher level of information asymmetries due to the knowledge –components of resources 
(Meyer et al. 2009b). 
Andreu et al (2010) apply RBV to testing the factors that influence the entry choice of Spanish 
tourism firms into new businesses. They argue that resource diversification contributes to long-
term sustainability and regional development (Ivars, 2003). Diversification has many advantages 
especially for the tourism industry which depends on regional resources in terms of economy, 
culture, nature and history.  
Entry mode choice is one of the main decisions in the diversification process. Montgomery 
(1994) argued that diversification on firm level is a function of its resource stock. Diversification 
may reflect a shortage of certain resources and capabilities that the firm needs for the purpose of 
taking the strategy, which in turn can determine the entry mode. According to Andreu et al. 
(2010), there are three entry strategies, namely internal growth, external growth, and 
intermediate or cooperative growth (cooperating with other companies which have the resources 
and capabilities). Meanwhile, Andreu et al. (2010) pinpointed the factors that influence the entry 
mode are categorized into two sets, namely the traits of the sector and the internal composition of 
resources and capabilities within the organization (Chatterjee & Singh, 1999); and other factors 
such as managerial experience, agency problems and the availability of information that may 
dilute the influence of purely economic factors.  
They hypothesized that the degree of similarity between the new business and the company’s 
original business positively associated with choice of internal growth. This conforms with Miller 
(2004) ‘s argument that firms using internal growth rather than external growth pursue less 
extensive diversification. They also proposed that the greater the company’s diversifying 
experience, the greater the likelihood that entry into the new business will take place via internal 
growth. The empirical results conform to previous studies which show that internal development 
is the best option for related diversification, while external development and cooperation 
agreements are more suitable for unrelated diversification, their findings also illuminate that 
tourism firms that have adopted these patterns have achieved higher profitability. 
  
Knowledge transfer perspective 
 
The perspective of knowledge transfer holds that the choice of entry mode relies on whether the 
knowledge is transferrable and the transfer is less costly. There are two kinds of knowledge, one 
is tacit knowledge and the other is common architecture knowledge (Kogut and Zander, 1993). 
The former is less codifiable and hard to teach, and the latter is codifiable and easy to transfer. 
According to their empirical study, the choice of transfer mode is determined by the efficiency of 
knowledge transfer. The firms would choose equity entry mode if there is large amount of tacit 
knowledge transfer and non-equity entry mode if large amount of common architecture 
knowledge is required.   
Management of knowledge flows within and across a firm’s boundary is critical to strategic 
success in a globalized competitive context. Hence, a global lodging firm can be regarded as a 
knowledge-based service company and consequently the hotel firm’s registered brand names, as 
well as unregistered, but proprietary reservations and logistics systems constitute codified 
strategic assets, which are a potent source of control over partners who are likely to conduct 
opportunistic behaviors (Contractor & Kundu, 1998). On the other hand, transferring tacit 
knowledge to a partner firm in a foreign nation can be difficult and costly, as it depends on, to a 
large extent, the absorptive capacity of learning new knowledge (Cohen & levinthal, 1990). Thus 
non-equity form of entry mode such as franchising can be less prevalent in developing countries 
(Contractor & Kundu, 1998).  
 
Agency theory 
 
Agency theory has been intensively on the fundamental concern related to the separation of 
ownership and control, and it highlights the importance of information transfer process. In the 
agency theory, the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard due to differences in interest 
and risk preferences existed between investors and managers, address the difficulties of assessing 
the capabilities and performance of foreign employees (managers), indicating less preference of 
non-equity and low-control entry mode such as franchising, in which the critical source of 
control is through the stern enforcement of franchising contract (Quinn & Doherty, 2000). In 
contrast, foreign institutional investors with globally diversified investing portfolios and superior 
administration capabilities are more likely to perform high-risk entry decisions especially in 
emerging market (Filatotchev et al. 2007). The phenomena of large amount of international 
merger and acquisition could be explained by the self-interest of managers who care about their 
careers, prestige power, and salary, job security (Haunschild, 1993).  
 
Institutional theory  
 
“Institutions” refers to the “rule of the game” (North, 1990) and are capable of shaping firm 
strategies in relation to foreign market entry (Peng, 2003). Scott (1995) defined the institutional 
environment in terms of three "pillars" being -the regulative, normative, and cognitive domains. 
North (1990) divided the institutional distance into two aspects, formal and informal. The 
perspective of institutional theory brings up the issue of institution from the “background” to the 
front and would enrich the study on the drivers of firm strategy and performance in IB (Peng, 
Wang and Jiang, 2008).  Institution theory suggests that legitimacy is crucial to the survival of 
firms. The decision of cross-border M&A largely depends on whether MNEs are able to easily 
and economically obtain legitimacy in the host country (Eden & Miller 2004; Kostova & Zaheer, 
1999; Xu & Shenkar 2002). MNEs that conduct acquisition would find it easier to obtain 
external legitimacy and internal consistency in host countries which have relatively small 
institutional distances (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999).   
 
Recent researches show that institutions are more than background conditions and can directly 
determine entry strategies, especially for the institutions in emerging economies, which is weak 
and far different from those developed in the developed countries. In a weak institution which 
lacks strong formal institutions, network (Guan Xi) among managers would function as informal 
institutions that substitute the lacking formal institution and facilitate the economic transactions 
(Peng et al, 2008). Thus alliances-based entry mode such as international joint venture can 
become a preferred strategic choice in weak institutional context (Peng, 2006). Xu and Shenkar 
(2002) also analyzed the entry choice under the circumstances of institutions. They argue that the 
longer regulative institutional distance is positively associated with Greenfield, and the cognitive 
and normative institutional distance is negatively associated with merger and acquisition.   
The factor of institutions has gained much attention and was considered as the third leg of 
“strategy tripod” which comprises institution-based view, industry-based view, and resource-
based view of IB strategy.  (Peng et al, 2008). Some scholars found institutions interact or 
influence the entry choice. For instance, Meyer et al. (2009a) found that institutional and 
resource effects crucially interact. They stated that the entry modes—Greenfield, acquisition, and 
joint venture facilitate firms to overcome different market inefficiencies associated with two 
characteristics of the resources and to the institutional context. Stronger Institutions ensure a 
higher degree of market effectiveness which encourages acquisitions. Thus JVs are chosen to 
approach many local resources in a weaker institutional framework, but it becomes less 
important in a stronger institutional framework where acquisition plays a more crucial role in 
accessing intangible and organizationally embedded resources. 
  
Eclectic paradigm 
 
Dunning’s OLI or Eclectic paradigm framework is among the most commonly adopted 
perspectives in the studies of cross-border entry modes. This OLI perspective was set up for the 
purpose of a distinguishable theory and later was developed as a holistic framework that brings 
concepts and theories from previous works together into one integrated construct. The three 
elements of Dunning’s OLI paradigm are ownership advantages, location advantages, and 
internalization advantages. Since it is not a theory, Dunning’s Eclectic Paradigm could be 
considered as a vehicle that integrate insights from resource-based (firm-specific), transaction 
cost economies (internalization), and institutional (location) theories (Brouthers and Hennart, 
2007) and that investigates how these theories interact with each other.  
Many studies applied this approach to the research on entry modes (Agarwal and Ramaswami 
1992; Padmanabhan & Cho, 1999; Cloninger, 2004; Tsai & cheng 2002; Nakos & Brouthers, 
2002, etc.). Brouthers, Brouthers, & Werner (1999) ‘s study shows that Dunning’s framework 
explains very well the firm performance and the fact that firms which choose entry mode based 
on the firm-specific (ownership), location-specific and internalization advantages tend to have 
better subsidiary performance. Tatoglu and Glaister (1998) investigated the investments in 
Turkey and found that OLI paradigm may affect manufacturing and service industry in a 
different manner.  
One of the good papers on entry mode was written by Brouthers and Hennart (2007), who 
reviewed the literature on international entry mode choice and gives a holistic view of the works 
on entry mode across the years of researches. Meanwhile, it pinpoints the weaknesses of the 
literature, and provides some suggestions on the further research. The authors addressed that the 
motive for entry may have a significant influence on the establishment modes besides the TCE, 
RBV, IT and OLI. And the interaction between strategic motives and other variables such as 
cultural differences is also worth further research. The authors pointed out although there is less 
research on SME mode choice, those theories for large firm mode decisions could be generalized 
to SME entry modes. In addition, the issue that firm boundaries influence the performance was 
ignored. The mode choice influences subsidiary performance. Finally, the authors provided 
directions for future theory development. They suggested that existing theories needs deepening, 
new and different theories such as strategic decision making (SDM) research that could help us 
gain a better understanding of mode choice decisions. The author also provides new and different 
methodologies such as multilevel sample analysis for the future research on entry mode.  
 
Hospitality management field 
 
In the research of entry choice in hospitality industry, Zhao (1993) completed the pioneer study 
that integrates the international strategic management perspective and international business 
perspective to investigate the antecedents of multinational lodging firms’ international entry 
choices. The results showed that multinational lodging firms’ selecting modes into foreign 
markets are determined by two categories of antecedent factors—external environment including 
political, economic, socio-cultural, technological and ecological factors; and internal 
environment in terms of competitor, customer, property location, supplier, strengths, partner 
selection and human factors (Zhao & Olsen, 1997). This study shows no relationship between the 
generic international strategies (such as Brand portfolio, niche market, standardization and 
adaptation, etc.) and entry modes. It also reveals that multinational lodging firms try to apply 
multiple entry modes at the mean time and their selection of entry modes are likely to be 
influenced by the degree of maturity of the host country. The study also indicates that minority 
equity participation is usually inseparable to management contract or franchise. Overall, the 
research found that the matches between the external and internal environment may affect the 
entry mode decision of multinational lodging firms, who may choose a wholly owned or long-
term lease entry mode if it has strong tangible assets. If a firm holds intangible assets and prefers 
to use similar operational modality used at home country, while the host countries expect the 
company to share those intangible assets, management contract or franchising may be 
appropriate entry mode. But multinational lodging firms need to modify their non-equity 
involvement into minority equity involvement to fit the requests from their partners in the host 
countries.  
Looking at the literature in hospitality field after 1994, there are only a few articles centering on 
international entry mode. Contractor and Kundu (1998) conducted an empirical study on the 
organizational forms in the international hotel sector. Domke-Damonte (2000) studied the 
interactive effects of international strategy and throughput technology on service firms’ entry 
mode.  Gannon and Keith (1997) highlighted the possibilities and difficulties of socialization 
control in different entry modes in the international hotel industry.  Brown, Dev and Zhou (2003) 
advocated that the ownership and control dimension of international entry mode should be 
separated and that cross-border entry mode decisions should be expanded to business activities 
beyond production and distribution. Recently, Andreu et al. (2010) applies RBV to explaining 
the relationships among diversification, entry choice and profitability in Spanish tourism 
industry. Gannon, Roper, and Doherty (2010) demonstrate that management contracts as “asset 
light” options for international market entry not only offer valuable equity and strategic 
opportunities but also decrease international hotel companies’ chances of developing and 
sustaining competitive advantage of human resources. They pinpointed that hotel firms should 
leverage their specific market entry expertise and develop mutually supportive relationships with 
their property-owning partners for the purpose of surmounting the challenges of managing 
human resources in the complex owned arrangement (management contracts).  
 
Discussion  
 
As shown above, there are generally two limitations in hospitality management research on this 
topic. Theoretically speaking, the management and IB theories used in the entry choice literature 
have not been fully applied in the hospitality field. Only the Eclectic paradigm, RBV and agency 
theory have been commonly applied in the field of hospitality management. Despite that 
hospitality field possesses special characteristics in terms of service features and ownership 
structures which may influence the form and motivation of international expansion, more 
attempts are imperative to test other theories that are commonly utilized in the hotel industry, one 
industry of the service sector. More interesting results may occur if empirical researches show 
some certain theories are particularly improper or proper in the hotel industry. Moreover, 
interesting findings might be shown if new theories immerge especially for the hospitality 
industry. Moreover, some papers are at the initial stage of elaborating facts and cases and haven’t 
used nor relate those facts to theories to explain the phenomena. This might result from the 
initially underdeveloped stage of research on this topic. More rational analysis based on theories 
is expected to improve research in hospitality field and bridge the gap between management and 
IB research and hospitality research.  
Methodologically speaking, such research in hospitality field lacks empirical analysis based on 
big sample size. This probably results from the considerable amount of private hospitality 
companies from which it is hard to obtain data. Many papers employ case studies which is an 
effective and necessary theory-exploring tool at the initial stage of theoretical development. 
However, such method tool doesn’t help much on establishing and developing theories at the 
next stages. Therefore more quantitative studies and the combination of both qualitative and 
quantitative studies are in badly needed to explore and set up theories exclusively in hospitality 
or service sector due to the special traits it possesses.   
Besides these, some new findings in management and IB research shed lights on certain issues 
such as the motivations of foreign expansion. While market-seeking or resource-seeking 
motivations will always characterize some portion of investment, there is an increasing role for 
the efficiency-seeking and strategic-asset seeking investment, which makes mergers and 
acquisitions as well as strategic alliances critical to the asset-augmenting FDI. A benefit of 
multinationality could be regarded as the access to specific geographically dispersed resources. 
The new development of quasi hierarch modality such as increasing application of cooperative 
arrangements is mainly due to critical constraint—net cost. Stability and trust in the network 
setup can be a critical management challenge as the costs of monitoring network activities can be 
substantial (Lundan & Hagedoorn, 2001). Some uses resource dependence perspective to explain 
M&A, which is a response to the constraints environment (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Haunschild, 
1993). When considered purely in terms of cash flow constraints, JV, minority ownership in 
subsidiaries and non-equity cooperative alliances have become modalities that are more 
attractive as many globally competitive firms have become squeezed the profits. This is 
particularly the case in recent years due to intensive global competition in the international 
hospitality industry and dramatic economic recession taking place in western world.  
Furthermore, more topics revolving around entry choice are about to be paid attention, such as 
the comparison on the performance of each entry mode and the exit strategy in certain contexts. 
Slangen & Hennart (2008) compared the performance of acquisitions and Greenfield and stated 
that low and intermediate levels of subsidiary integration contribute to higher performance of 
acquisitions than that of Greenfield, and higher integration makes Greenfields outperform 
acquisitions. Some IB scholars (Dai, 2010) have noticed the exit strategies that MNC took under 
certain circumstances such as war etc. Hospitality firms also determine to exit markets after 
certain years’ operation. What are the antecedents of the exit strategy? Would it be possible to 
contribute the decision to war, institutional distances, geographical distances, economical clash, 
etc? These areas have much research potential in the area of hospitality management. 
  
Conclusion  
 
This paper picks six main theoretical perspectives which are commonly applied by scholars in 
explaining the entry mode. They are transaction cost analysis, the resource-based view, 
knowledge transfer perspective, agency theory, institutional theory, and Dunning’s eclectic 
framework. TCE argues that managers suffer from bounded rationality, whereas potential 
partners may opportunistically act if given the chance. Asset specificity, uncertainty and 
frequency are the three TCE factors that influence entry choice. The resource-based view 
(including knowledge-based and organizational capabilities theories) suggests that firms acquire 
a set of firm-specific resources and capabilities that are valuable and inimitable, and develop 
proprietary resources that they can exploit in foreign markets or use foreign markets as a source 
for developing new resource-based advantage. But the issue is that the measures of resource are 
debatable, and such perspective needs to be complemented by other perspectives such as TCE or 
institutional theory. Knowledge transfer perspective holds entry choice depends on the easiness 
of transferring knowledge based on the traits of the knowledge. Agency theory emphasizes the 
high risks of low-control entry mode resulting from self-interest inclination of foreign partners. 
The institutional theory suggests that country-level institutional environment influences firms’ 
entry choices because of the host countries’ institutions refine or facilitate firms’ operation by 
“rule of the game”. The eclectic framework brings together three components, ownership, 
location advantages, and internalization advantages to explain the entry choices.  
However, the above theories that are commonly used in management and IB research haven’t 
fully applied in hospitality field. This research in hospitality industry is still on the initial stage of 
theoretical development, characterized by the lack of theory application and simply 
methodologies. Furthermore, while motives for international expansion are gained sufficient 
attention by management, IB and hospitality management scholars, other variables such as the 
performance of different the entry modes are worth further study. There is less attention on the 
institutional influences on the entry choice and they are always considered as control variables. 
Such variables as institutional distance which are heat-discussed in management and IB field 
also need more consideration. Finally, theories on international entry choice exclusively for 
hospitality or service industry are expected to be set up by leveraging management and IB 
theories and applying the traits of hospitality firms.  
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